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Hagel: School Law - Unlimited Liability for Schools or Appropriate Prote

CASE NOTES
or
Liability for Schools
SCHOOL LAW-Unlimited
Dist.
v.
Sch.
Murrell
Victims?
for
Appropriate Protection
No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
INTRODUCTION

In late 1993, a severely disabled student in Denver alleged that
her school had failed to respond appropriately after she was battered and
sexually assaulted by a fellow student on several occasions. In Murrell v.
School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,' a three-judge panel for the

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed a trial
court ruling in her favor, applying a new; controversial standard for reviewing such complaints of so-called peer sexual harassment in schools.
The standard applied in Murrell, which allowed the courts to impose
liability on schools and school officials for failing to take appropriate
action in such incidents, was handed down just a couple of months before in a 5-4 decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case of
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.2

The events leading up to the Tenth Circuit's decision in August
1999 began some six years earlier. Penelope Jones enrolled at Denver's
George Washington High School in October 1993.3 Jones was born with
spastic cerebral palsy, which severely impairs her ability to use and control the right side of her body.4 She is deaf in her left ear, and testing
showed that she functioned at the intellectual and developmental level of
a first grader.'
According to allegations in the original complaint filed by
Jones's mother, Penelope Murrell, Jones was assigned to a special education program taught by teachers Kathleen Brady and Nelia Hicks.6 Her
troubles began when she encountered another special education student,
"John Doe," who was alleged to have significant disciplinary and behav1.
2.
3.
1999).
4.
5.
6.

186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999).
526 U.S. 629 (1999).
Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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ioral problems that included sexually inappropriate conduct. 7 Although
school officials allegedly knew about Doe's behavioral problems, the
school appointed him to a position as a "janitor's assistant," through
which he gained access to unsupervised areas of the school.8 Sometime
in November 1993, Doe allegedly took Jones to a secluded area and
sexually assaulted her. 9 A janitor discovered the two students, returned
them to class and advised the teachers where he had found them.' 0 Although the teachers allegedly knew that Doe had sexually assaulted Ms.
Jones on this occasion, they did not inform her mother."
During November 1993, the sexual assaults allegedly continued.
On at least one of the occasions on which Doe allegedly battered and
sexually assaulted her, Jones informed the teachers of Doe's conduct.
The teachers allegedly told Jones not to tell her mother about the incident and encouraged her to forget it had happened at all.'
On or about November 24, 1993, Doe allegedly again took Jones
to a secluded area of the school and battered and sexually assaulted
her.1 3 The complaint alleges that although the teachers knew she had
been battered and may have known she was sexually assaulted, they informed Murrell only about the non-sexual battery.' 4
Because of these incidents, and because she had begun to engage
in self-destructive and suicidal behavior, Jones left school and entered a
psychiatric hospital.' 5 Only then did Murrell learn about the sexual assaults and batteries of her daughter by Doe. 16 Although Murrell immediately contacted the teachers to advise them of what she had learned, the
teachers denied the incidents could have occurred, told Murrell to send
Jones back to school and refused to discuss the matter further.' 7 A tele-

7. Id. The opinion is not specific as to the precise nature of Doe's alleged sexually
inappropriate conduct.
8. Id. The opinion does not describe the precise nature of the employment relationship between Doe and the school.
9. Id.

10. Id. It is not clear from the opinion whether the janitor actually observed the
alleged sexual assault.
II.

12.
13.

14.

Id.
Id. at 1244.
Id.
Id. The opinion is not specific as to the precise nature of the alleged non-sexual

battery.
15.
Id.
16.
17.

Id.

Id.
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phone call
to the principal, Vivian Johnston, allegedly went unan8
swered.'
Jones was released from the hospital and attempted to return to
school on December 6, 1993, but stayed for only one day because she
allegedly was once again battered by Doe and ridiculed by other students
for his earlier sexual attacks on her.' 9 Following several unsuccessful
attempts to contact the school principal, Murrell learned from the teachers and Doe's mother that school officials had scheduled a meeting to
discuss Doe's sexual conduct with Jones.20 That meeting was held on
December 10, 1993, and was attended by the principal, Doe's mother,
the teachers, Murrell and her husband, and Jones. The teachers and the
principal allegedly were hostile toward Jones and Murrell. 2' The principal allegedly suggested that the sexual contact between the two students
may have been consensual, although she knew that Jones was legally
incapable of consenting and that Doe had admitted assaulting Jones after
she had resisted his advances.22
The principal allegedly declined to investigate the incident, and
when Murrell suggested that she suspend both students pending an investigation, the principal allegedly responded by suspending only Ms.
Jones for "behavior ...detrimental to the welfare, safety or morals of
other pupils or school personnel. 23
In the meantime, the school district allegedly neither notified appropriate law enforcement officials nor disciplined Doe in any way. 24 He
continued to attend George Washington High School and retained his job
as a janitor's assistant, with the same access to all parts of the school
that he had previously enjoyed.25
Murrell filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado on her own behalf and as guardian ad litem for her
daughter. 26 The complaint named the principal and the teachers individually and in their capacities as school officials. 27 Murrell asserted that the
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. The opinion does not specifically state whether Doe admitted to sexually
assaulting Jones or whether his alleged admission related to non-sexual battery.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.at 1242.
27. Id.
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school district violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
(Title IX), 28 based on the school district's alleged knowledge of and failure to remedy sustained sexual harassment, assault, and battery of
Jones.29 Murrell also asserted two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
the school district, and individually against the principal and the two
teachers.3 a The first of these constitutional claims alleged that the school
district, principal, and teachers violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to remedy Doe's sexual harassment of Jones. 1 In her second § 1983 claim, Murrell alleged that the
school district, principal, and teachers violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to protect Jones from Doe.32
The district court dismissed the action under Rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.33 The court, which acted prior to the issuance of
the United States Supreme Court opinion in Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education,3 4 held that Title IX provides no cause of action for a
school's failure to prevent and remedy student-on-student sexual harassment, and that the school district had no constitutional duty to protect
Jones from assaults by a fellow student.3 5 Murrell and Jones appealed the
Title IX and equal protection claims to the Tenth Circuit, which relied
on the then-newly issued opinion in Davis.36 The Tenth Circuit reversed
the district court's dismissal of the Title IX claim and the equal protection claim as to the principal and teachers as individuals, finding that the
elements needed to establish a school's Title IX liability for peer sexual
harassment, as outlined in Davis, were satisfied, and that the individual
school employees enjoyed no qualified immunity from the equal protec28. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1999). The statute provides in pertinent part: "No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving federal financial assistance ...
29.
Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1242.
30.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The statute provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ...
31.
Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1242.
32.
Id.
33.
Id. at 1243.
34.
526 U.S. 629 (1999).

35.
36.

Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1243.
Id. at 1245.
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tion claim. 3 7 However, the court affirmed the district court's decision on
the equal protection claim as applied to the school district, finding that
the complaint failed to allege that the school district engaged in an "official policy" or "custom" of deliberate indifference to sexual harassment.3 8
This case note traces the evolution of the law governing peer
sexual harassment cases and examines how the Murrell court applied
rules laid out in Davis. The Davis court was sharply divided, and the
decision included a lengthy, stinging dissent that predicted a wide range
of undesirable consequences as a result of the majority's holding. This
note examines whether the concerns raised by the dissent in Davis were
borne out in the Murrell case, and speculates on the Murrell decision's
potential effect on liability for schools within the Tenth Circuit.
BACKGROUND

Although the problem of student-on-student sexual harassment
has probably been a feature of public education for decades, it was only
during the 1990s that the federal courts began considering claims in
which plaintiffs sought to impose liability against schools for the actions
of students over which the schools exercised authority. The law in this
area developed in increments, as the courts first resolved the question of
whether private claims for monetary damages were available under Title
IX. The courts then struggled to reconcile the imposition of liability with
settled principles of agency law and qualified immunity for individual
school officials, as well as questions about adequate notice for schools
receiving federal funds.
Early cases
1. Franklinv. Gwinnett County Public Schools.
One of the early cases that paved the way for later claims of sexual harassment of students by fellow students was Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Public Schools. 39 Franklin did not involve a student in the role of
harasser, but rather a teacher and coach who made sexual advances toward a female student and ultimately subjected her to coercive sexual
intercourse. 40 The case presented the question of whether the implied
right of action under Title IX, first recognized by the Supreme Court in
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 1249, 1251-52.
Id. at 1249-50.
503 U.S. 60 (1992).
Id. at 63.
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Cannon v. University of Chicago,4 ' supported a claim for monetary damages.42
In Franklin, the Court reversed both the federal district court and
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and held that
a damages remedy is available for an action brought to enforce Title
IX. 4' The Court reasoned that Congress had no intention to limit the
44
remedies available to a complainant in a suit brought under Title IX,
and reaffirmed the longstanding rule articulated in Bell v. Hood,45 that
when a federal statute provides for a general right to sue, "federal courts
may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done. 46
2. Doe v. Petaluma City School District.
With the right to sue and recover money damages under Title IX
established, the stage was set for the first cases to consider the question
of a school's liability for student-on-student sexual harassment. The issue was first decided by a federal court in Doe v. Petaluma City School
District.7 Doe involved the case of a female junior high school student
who was subjected to harassment by both male and female peers, which
took the form of sexual comments and lewd writings about Doe on the
school's restroom walls. 48 Doe was subjected to epithets such as "slut"
and "ho" (slang for whore), and taunts of her having a hot dog in her
pants.4 9 Doe and her parents informed a school counselor of these incidents numerous times, and for several months the counselor refused to
take any action at all, telling Doe that "boys will be boys" and "girls
cannot sexually harass other girls." 50 Although the counselor did finally
warn some of the offenders, he never reported the incidents to the
school's Title IX officer, nor did he ever tell Doe or her parents that the
school had a Title IX policy and a Title IX officer who was responsible
for enforcing the policy.5 '
Doe's complaint raised the issue that would become important in
subsequent cases involving peer sexual harassment-whether the inac41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.

441 U.S. 677 (1979).
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 63 (1992).
Id.at 76.
Id. at 73.
327 U.S. 678 (1946).
Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66.

47.

54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995).

48.

Id. at 1449.

49.
50.

Id. at 1456.

51.

Id.

Id.
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tion of a school official violated her rights under Title IX and thereby
gave rise to a cause of action under section 1983. She sued both the
school district and the school counselor as an individual.5 2 After a partial
dismissal, she filed a second amended complaint, asserting a Title IX
claim against the school only, and a section 1983 claim against the counselor only. 53 The district court held in part that for a school district to be
liable for money damages for failure to take appropriate action in response to complaints of student-on-student sexual harassment, a court
must find that it intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff on the
basis of sex.54 The court also ruled that the counselor could not be sued
as an individual under Title IX but could be sued for Title IX violations
through section 1983, and that the counselor was not entitled to qualified
immunity. 5 The counselor appealed, asking the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to resolve whether he could be sued for a
Title IX violation under section 1983.56 The appellate court ruled in the
counselor's favor because:
[W]e cannot say that [the counselor's] duty to act under Title IX
was clearly established at the time of his inaction ....[I]t is not
reasonable to charge [the counselor] at the time in question with
the kind of knowledge, foresight or even ingenuity required to
anticipate that Title VII analogies might be used in this
fashion
7
IX.F
Title
under
Doe
to
liable
individually
him
to hold
As if to forewarn, the court noted that if the counselor "engaged in the
same conduct today, he might not be entitled to qualified immunity.

58

3. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education.
The federal judiciary seemed ready to embrace a broader application of Title IX protections in the area of peer sexual harassment in the
schools when the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion in Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education,5 9 which preceded later Supreme Court consideration of the same case. In Davis, the parents of a fifth grade female
student, LaShonda, brought an action against the school board, the
school superintendent, and the elementary school principal, alleging
52. Id. at 1449.
53. Id.
54.
Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
55. Doe, 54 F.3d at 1449.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1452. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits sex-based harassment in the context of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1999).
58.
Doe, 54 F.3d at 1452.
59.
74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996).
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sexual harassment by a fellow classmate. 60 The alleged harassment by
the classmate, "G.F.," occurred over a six-month period of time, and
included such activity as attempts to fondle LaShonda, fondling her, and
directing offensive language toward her.6 ' G.F.'s actions increased in
severity until he finally was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, sexual
battery in May 1993.62 Although LaShonda reported each of the incidents to her teachers and her mother, and her mother regularly reported
the incidents to the teachers and/or the principal, the school officials
failed to take any action to protect LaShonda.63 Even Davis's request
that LaShonda's assigned seat next to G.F. be changed to a different location was refused, and she was not allowed to move her seat away from
G.F. until she had complained for more than three months. 64 School officials never removed or disciplined G.F. in any manner for his sexual
harassment of LaShonda. ss
Davis brought the lawsuit under Title IX and section 1983, asserting that the school officials' failure to act discriminated against
LaShonda and denied her the benefits of a public education in violation
of Title IX, and that the school's omissions violated LaShonda's liberty
interest to be free from sexual harassment in violation of her substantive
due process rights under the United States Constitution. 66
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed the Title IX, claim against the board, concluding:
The sexually harassing behavior of a fellow fifth grader is not
part of a school program or activity. Plaintiff does not allege that
the Board or an employee of the Board had any role in the harassment. Thus, any harm to LaShonda was not proximately
caused by a federally funded education provider.6 7
The court also dismissed the section 1983 due process claims
against the board and the individual defendants, stating that LaShonda
60. Id. at 1189.
61.
Id. at 1188.
62. Id. at 1189.
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1188.
67.
Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363, 367 (M.D. Ga.
1994). The Supreme Court has held that Title IX may be enforced through an implied
private right of action. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992).
However, only federally funded institutions can be held liable for violating the Title IX.
Lipsett v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 901 (1st Cir. 1988).
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had not alleged any special relationship between herself and the school,
nor had she alleged that the defendants placed her in a dangerous situathe state did not act to make her less cation. 68 In short, the court held,
69
pable of caring for herself.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Davis's due process and
equal protection claims without discussion. 70 However, the appeals court
reversed the lower court on the Title IX claim against the school board.7 '
The court held that (1) Title IX encompasses claims for damages due to
a sexually hostile educational environment created by a fellow student or
students when supervising authorities knowingly fail to act to eliminate
harassment, and (2) the student sufficiently stated a Title IX claim
against the school board for damages for a sexually hostile educational
environment created by a fellow classmate.72
The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Franklin, which applied a Title VII hostile environment
analysis to a Title IX claim for damages.73
Thus, we conclude that as Title VII encompasses a claim for
damages due to a sexually hostile working environment created
by co-workers and tolerated by the employer, Title IX encompasses a claim for damages due to a sexually hostile educational
environment created by a fellow student or students when the
supervising authorities knowingly fail to act to eliminate the harassment.74
The court noted that "a student should have the same protection in
school that an employee has in the workplace.

75

4. Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District.
If it appeared that the law governing peer sexual harassment in
the schools was developing in an orderly fashion following the Eleventh
Circuit's opinion in Davis, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit completely muddied the waters in Rowinsky v. Bryan Inde68.
69.
70.

Aurelia D., 862 F. Supp. at 366.
Id.
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1188 (11 th Cir. 1996).

71.
Id. Davis did not appeal the district court's dismissal of the Title IX claims
against the individual defendants.
72.
Id. at 1193, 1195.
73.

Id. at 1191.

74.

Id.at 1193 (emphasis added).
Id.at 1192.

75.
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pendent School District.7 6 Rowinsky rejected the Davis analysis, holding
that Title IX prohibits only acts by recipients of federal financial assistance themselves (the schools or their employees), not the acts of third
parties, such as students who allegedly engaged in sexual harassment
against fellow students.77
Rowinsky relied heavily on agency principles for its decision,
noting that Title IX is legislation authorized by the Spending Clause of
the United States Constitution7" and that "imposing liability for the acts
of third parties would be incompatible with the purpose of a spending
condition, because grant recipients have little control over the multitude
of third parties who could conceivably violate the prohibitions of Title
IX."9 The Rowinsky court held that a school district might violate Title
IX "if it treated sexual harassment of boys more seriously than sexual
harassment of girls, or even if it turned a blind eye toward sexual harassment of girls while addressing assaults that harmed boys. ' 0
The Tenth Circuit quickly followed the Fifth Circuit's Rowinsky
holding in the case of Seamons v. Snow. 8 ' A male student brought Title
IX and section 1983 claims against the school district and various school
officials after he was assaulted by five upper class football teammates
and bound naked to a towel rack with adhesive tape. The victim's genitals were also taped and one of his teammates brought a girl the victim
had dated into the locker room to view him.8 2 The court dismissed the
claims on grounds that he had not alleged that the harassment was based
on sex-for example, that he failed to allege the school officials would
have responded differently had a female student brought a similar
claim. 3
The Office for Civil Rights Guidelines
If the law in the area of student-on-student sexual harassment
appeared to be in disarray during the mid-1990s due to the federal
courts' varying interpretations and inconsistent application of Title IX
76.

80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1012 (emphasis added).
Id. The Spending Clause provides in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have the
power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States .
U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
79. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1013.
80. Id. at 1016.
81.
84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996).
82. Id. at 1230.
83. Id. at 1233.
77.
78.
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standards, the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR)
evinced no uncertainty when it issued its comprehensive guidelines on
the matter in early 1997. Titled Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties
(Guidance), the document stated bluntly, "OCR continues to believe that
the Rowinsky decision was wrongly decided. ' 4
The Guidance makes clear that the OCR favors broad application
of Title IX principles to claims of peer sexual harassment in the schools.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Davis, a school could not be
held liable for the actions of its students because students are not agents
of their schools.8 s Rather than reject such an agency theory, the Guidance would simply hold schools liable for their own misconduct: "Title
X does not make a school responsible for the actions of harassing students, but rather for its own discrimination in failing to remedy it once
the school has notice.4 6 Additionally, the Guidance states that a school
has actual notice of sexual harassment if an agent of the school receives
notice.8 7
The Guidance makes clear that not all behavior with sexual connotations constitutes sexual harassment under federal law. The harassment must be "sufficiently severe, persistent or pervasive that it adversely affects a student's education or creates a hostile or abusive educational environment."'8 The Guidance implies that alarmist concerns
about innocent behavior giving rise to federal tort liability are unfounded: referencing a newspaper account of a six-year-old boy who was
punished for kissing a female classmate, the document noted, "[t]he
Guidance confirms that a kiss8 9on the cheek by a first grader does not
constitute sexual harassment.
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District
The next major development in the law governing peer sexual
harassment of students involved the case of Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District" Gebser concerned a male teacher who allegedly seduced a female high school student. The student then brought
claims against the school district based on the theories of respondeat
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,036 (1997).
Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d 1238, 1245 (1999).
62 Fed. Reg. at 12,040.
Id. at 12,042.
Id. at 12,034.

89.

Id.

90.

524 U.S. 274 (1998).
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superior and constructive notice. 9' The plaintiff, Gebser, had not reported the relationship to school officials. 92 The Supreme Court decided
five-to-four against Gebser's arguments, establishing that for a school
district to be liable under Title IX, a school official must have "actual
knowledge of discrimination" and must have "authority to address the
alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures" while "failing adequately to respond. 9 3 Further, the Gebser majority stated, the
response must amount to "deliberate indifference" to discrimination for a
damages remedy to be applicable. 94 Thus, although Gebser did not involve a case of peer sexual harassment of a student, it established a standard that would be applied in future court decisions relating to peer sexual harassment.
Writing for the dissent, Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's conclusion that Gebser had not alleged an intentional violation of
Title IX of the type recognized in Franklin.9 5 Justice Stevens noted that
the sexual abuse of Gebser committed by the teacher was surely intentional and that it occurred during, and as a part of, a curriculum activity
in which he wielded authority over Gebser that had been delegated to
him by the school.96 The activity was subsidized, in part, with federal
funds.97 The Court's holding that the law does not provide a damages
remedy in the case is at odds with settled principles of agency law, Stevens noted, under which the district is responsible for the teacher's misconduct because he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence
of the agency relationship. 98
The Supreme Court's resolution of Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education
The most important decision in the evolution of the law relating
to peer sexual harassment of students was handed down in 1999 by the
Supreme Court in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education99 Davis
reached the Supreme Court after the Eleventh Circuit, en banc, vacated
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 283.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 290.

Id.
Id. at 297-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 298.
Id.
98.
Id. at 298-99. The Gebser majority held that agency principles do not apply
under Title IX, as they do under Title VII employment discrimination claims, because
Title IX does not include specific reference to an educational institution's "agents." Id.

at 283.
99.

526 U.S. 629 (1999).
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the prior decision by the Eleventh Circuit panel and held that Davis had
not stated a claim under Title IX.1°
The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision authored by Justice O'Connor, reversed the Eleventh Circuit's en banc decision, effectively affirming the previous panel decision. The Court's decision also
reads as an affirmation of at least some of the language used by the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights when it issued its 1997
Guidance. For example, the Court held that a school district can be liable
for peer sexual harassment if the harassment is "so severe, pervasive,
and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the
victims' educational experience, that the victim-students are effectively
denied equal access to an institution's resources and opportunities.'" 0 '
Yet the Court also implied that plaintiffs would continue to have to meet
a difficult burden of proof, noting that "[d]amages are not available for
simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children, even
where these comments target differences in gender."' 2
Additionally, the Court referenced the "actual knowledge" and
"deliberate indifference" standard established in Gebser when it noted
that federal funding recipients could be liable in damages "only where
their own deliberate indifference effectively 'caused' the discrimination
...
The Court further held that, "[d]eliberate indifference makes
sense as a theory of direct liability under Title IX only where the funding
recipient has some control over the alleged harassment. A recipient cannot be directly liable for its indifference where it lacks the authority to
take remedial action. '' 4
99,'0

Thus, the Davis Court made clear that a court may impose liability under Title IX for peer sexual harassment of students when the harassing behavior is so severe, pervasive, and offensive that it denies students equal access to federally funded education opportunities, while
school officials with actual knowledge of, and authority to remedy, the
harassment remain deliberately indifferent.'o
Davis was notable for a stinging dissent that was nearly as long
as the majority opinion. The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice
100.
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1406 (11th Cir. 1997)
(en banc).
101.
102.
104.
105.

Id. at 652.
Id. at 642-43.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 646-47.
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Kennedy and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, was rooted in faithful adherence to federalism and outlined five
major points of opposition:
I. The majority opinion obliterates distinctions between national
and local spheres of interest by allowing the federal government
to wield its Spending Clause power without concern for the federal balance. 0 6 Only if states receive clear notice of the conditions attached to the grant of federal funds can they guard against
excessive federal intrusion into state affairs and be vigilant in
07
policing the boundaries of federal power.
2. The Davis majority has created unlimited Title IX liability
that will result in the diversion of scarce resources from educating children as schools are forced to defend against meritless
claims. Schools will respond by adopting whatever federal code
of student conduct the Department of Education sees fit to impose on them. The federal government is thus imposing itself
into one of the most traditional areas of state concern. 0 8
3. Title IX does not impose an unambiguous duty on schools to
remedy peer sexual harassment. Title IX prohibits only misconduct by grant recipients, not misconduct by third parties, and the
majority opinion represents "arbitrary line-drawing" without explaining what degree of control over students is sufficient to impose liability on schools.' 0 9 The majority view is a rejection of
agency principles and, even though the Court has not recognized
liability of non-agents under Title VII, it rejects out of hand an
agency limitation on Title IX."
4. A school's control over students is much more complicated
and limited than the majority acknowledges."' In some states,
schools have a continuing duty to educate even students who are
suspended or expelled.1 2 Schools cannot exercise the same degree of control over thousands of students that they do over a

106.

107.

Id. at 654 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 655 (citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 217 (1987) (Kennedy, J.,

dissenting)).
108. Id. at 657-658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 662 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
110. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 664 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 666 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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few hundred adult employees."' Further, the majority failed to
deal with distinctions between elementary, high school, and university students. The Davis decision applies with equal force to
universities, which do not4 exercise custodial or tutelary power
over their adult students."
5. The schools are the "primary locus of most children's social
development" and accordingly are "rife with inappropriate be'" 5
havior by children . . .learning to interact with their peers."
Norms of the adult workplace which have defined hostile environment sexual harassment are not easily translated to peer relationships in the schools. "A teacher's sexual overtures to a student are always inappropriate, while a student's romantic overtures to a classmate (even when persistent and unwelcome) are
an inescapable part of adolescence." '"1 6 Almost every child is at
one time or another teased by peers in school. "The majority's
test for actionable harassment will, as a result, sweep in almost
all of the more innocuous conduct it acknowledges as a ubiquitous part of school life." 117 "After today, Johnny will find the
routine problems of adolescence are to be resolved by invoking' 8a
federal right to demand assignment to a desk two rows away.""
Most disturbing is that "[t]he majority does not even purport to
explain what constitutes an actionable "denial of equal access to
education.""19

Despite the forcefulness of the dissenting opinion, the Davis majority made clear that school officials would no longer be able to hide
behind agency principles and avoid liability for student-on-student sex-

ual harassment, even though "substantial control" over the harasser is
most easily demonstrated when the offender is an agent of the funding
recipient. 20 Rather than hold a school liable for the actions of its students, who are not agents of the school, the Davis decision noted that
2'
liability in Gebser was predicated on the school's own failure to act.'
The Court noted that it had previously observed "that the nature of [the
State's] power [over public schoolchildren] is custodial and tutelary,
113.
114.
115.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 667 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 672 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 678 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 686 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 676 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 645.
Id. at 645-46.
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permitting a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults."' 2 2 Davis thus resolved most of the issues with
which federal courts wrestled earlier and provided a standard for evaluating future claims against schools for student-on-student sexual harassment.
PRINCIPAL CASE

The case of Murrell v. School DistrictNo. 1, Denver, Colorado,
presented factual circumstances that, while roughly analogous to those
alleged in Davis, were even more egregious and presented a more vulnerable victim. In determining that liability could be imposed on both
the school and individual school officials for alleged deliberate indifference, the Tenth Circuit found the facts of Murrell easily susceptible to a
Davis-type analysis.
Murrell reached the Tenth Circuit after the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Murrell's claims for failure
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 123 The district court
concluded that Murrell failed to establish liability on the part of the
school based on the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Rowinsky. 124 Rowinsky
held that agency principles do not apply under Title IX and that a school
district is not liable for the conduct of a harassing student because the
25
student is not an agent of the school.
After hearing oral argument on appeal, the Murrell court delayed
the case pending the Supreme Court's review of Davis. 21 6 The court recognized that the outcome of Davis would be dispositive of many of the
issues it would face in deciding Murrell. 27 Once Davis was decided, the
Tenth Circuit requested supplemental briefing on the effect of the Davis
decision.'2 8 Under the rule of Davis, the Tenth Circuit recognized, a
plaintiff must allege four factors to state a claim for school district liability under Title IX: (1) actual knowledge of, and (2) deliberate indifference to (3) harassment that was so severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive that it (4) deprived the victim of access to the educational
129
benefits of the school.
122.
123.

Id. at 646 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)).
Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 186 F.3d at 1238, 1243 (1999).

124.

Id. at 1245.

125.
126.

See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text.
Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1245.

127.
128.

Id.
Id.

129.

Id. at 1246.
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The court, accepting all of the plaintiff's allegations as true for
purposes of the appeal, 3 ° concluded that Murrell sufficiently alleged
actual knowledge and deliberate indifference, the first two prongs of the
Davis analysis. 131 Murrell alleged that she had telephoned the principal
to discuss Doe's conduct, and therefore the principal had actual knowledge of the assaults at least as of the time Jones was in the hospital. 3 2
The court also noted that it had no doubt that the principal, as the highest-ranking administrator at the school, exercised substantial control
over Doe and the school environment during school hours. 133 The Denver Public Schools had a sexual harassment policy that prohibited peer
sexual harassment and provided that grievances would routinely be filed
with the principal, and that the principal had authority to suspend students for behavior detrimental to the welfare, safety, or morals of other
students. According to the complaint, the principal never appropriately
disciplined Doe, who continued to enjoy access to unsupervised parts of
the school. 34 The court said, "Her [the principal's] complete refusal to
investigate known claims of the nature advanced by Ms. Murrell, if true,
amounts to deliberate indifference.' 3 5
The court also found that, "at least at this stage of the proceedings," it must accept as true Murrell's allegation that Jones's teachers
were invested with the authority to halt Mr. Doe's known sexually asplainly
saultive behavior. "If they were, their alleged response
36 quite
asserted.
court
the
indifference,"
amounts to deliberate
The court next considered whether the harassment inflicted upon
Jones was sufficiently "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" to
satisfy the third prong of the Davis test. Because Doe "repeatedly took
Jones to a secluded area and battered, undressed, and sexually assaulted
her," the court had no trouble concluding that "the alleged wrongdoing
was sufficiently severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive" to state a

claim.

137

130. Review of dismissal under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is de novo, with the court
accepting as true the factual allegations in the complaint and drawing all reasonable
inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1231-32 (10th Cir.
1996). Dismissal is inappropriate unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle plaintiff to relief.
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1247.
Id.

Id.
Id. at 1248.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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Finally, with respect to the Title IX claims, the court considered
whether the school officials' deliberate indifference deprived Jones of
educational opportunities or benefits to which she was entitled. Because
Jones had to leave the school to be hospitalized, and because the principal suspended Jones after her mother suggested the school district should
investigate the claim and Jones became home bound, the court had no
trouble concluding that she was deprived of educational opportunities or
benefits."a' Thus, the court reversed the district court's order dismissing
Murrell's Title IX claim. 3 9
The court next considered the issues associated with the district
court's dismissal of Murrell's claim under § 1983. Her complaint alleged
that by failing to take steps to eradicate the hostile environment created
by Doe, the school district, the principal, and teachers individually deprived Jones of her constitutional right to equal protection of the laws
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 40 The defendants argued on appeal
that the claim was properly dismissed because: (1) Murrell's complaint
failed to allege intentional gender-based discrimination by the school
district in the form of an official policy to discriminate and therefore
failed to state an equal protection claim as a matter of law; (2) respondeat superior liability is not available under section 1983; and (3) the
4
individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.' '
The court concluded that Murrell's complaint failed to reveal
any allegation that the school district engaged in an official policy or
custom of deliberate indifference to sexual harassment, which is necessary to establish municipal or school district liability for sexual harassment under the Fourteenth Amendment. 142 Additionally, the court found
nothing in the complaint to indicate that either the principal or the teachers possessed the requisite policy-making authority for purposes of establishing municipal liability under § 1983, and held that the § 1983
43
claim against the school district was therefore properly dismissed.
138.
Id. at 1248-49.
139. Id. at 1249.
140. Id. The Equal Protection Clause provides: "No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Ms. Murrell had also argued in her original complaint that the school district violated
Ms. Jones's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but did
not revisit that claim on appeal and the Tenth Circuit deemed it waived. Id. at 1249 &
n.5.
141.
Id. at 1249.
142. Id. at 1249-50 (citing Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 446-50 (10th Cir.

1995)).
143. Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1250 (citing Randle, 69 F.3d at 447-50; Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986)).
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Nevertheless, the court held that the claim was sufficient to state
a case for individual liability against the principal and teachers under the
Equal Protection Clause and that the principal and teachers were not
entitled to qualified immunity.1 " By way of contrast to institutional liability, the court noted, a governmental official or supervisory employee
may be held liable under section 1983 upon a showing of deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment. 45 Because Murrell's claim alleged that the principal and teachers knew about Doe's harassment of
Jones and acquiesced in that conduct by refusing to reasonably respond
under section 1983
to it, the court held that she properly stated a claim
46
individually.
teachers
and
principal
against the
Although the three-judge panel's decision was unanimous as to
the result, a concurring opinion by Judge Anderson suggested that some
of the language in the court's Title IX analysis was unnecessarily broad,
implying that a single teacher's inaction may in some circumstances be
enough to trigger Title IX liability. 47 A single teacher's sexual misconduct was not enough to subject a recipient to liability in Gebser, Judge
Anderson noted, and he suggested it is still an open question after Davis
whether a single teacher's indifference is ever sufficient for recipient's
liability, 4 notwithstanding the Davis dissent's characterization of the
opinion.1 1
The decision thus held that Murrell had properly stated a claim
against the school district under Title IX and against the principal and
teachers individually under section 1983.
ANALYSIS

As one of the first cases in the United States to apply the princi144. Id. at 1251. The court noted that individual defendants in an action under § 1983
are entitled to qualified immunity unless it is demonstrated that their conduct violated
clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person in their positions
would have known. Id. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Further,
the court stated that "it has been clearly established since 1992 that a person who exercises the state's supervisory authority may be held liable for consciously acquiescing in
sexually harassing conduct by a non-state actor over whom the state actor has authority." Id. (quoting Woodward v. City of Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1401 (10th Cir; 1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
145.
146.

Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1250.
Id. at 1250-51.

Id. at 1252 (Anderson, J., concurring).
147.
148. Id. (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 679-80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (postulating that a district might "be held liable for a teacher's failure to remedy peer harassment.")).
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pies set forth by the Supreme Court in Davis, the Murrell case presents a
natural opportunity to evaluate the legal and social policy effects of the
Davis decision, at least as applied to a single Colorado school district.
Based on its application of the principles announced in Davis,
Murrell was correctly decided. The Tenth Circuit's systematic and faithful adherence to the relevant standards established in Davis resulted in
an outcome that served the interests of justice while strengthening the
law governing sexual harassment in the schools. If the allegations in the
Murrell complaint are true, Penelope Jones quite plainly was denied
equal access to educational opportunities by the school's tolerance of
sexual assaults against her by a fellow student. Title IX's purpose is to
provide a remedy for victims of sexual discrimination by schools that
receive federal funds, and by applying the standard of review set forth in
Davis, the Murrell court determined that her allegations deserve to be
litigated.
As already set forth, the dissent in Davis predicted horrific consequences for local schools, states' rights, and the federal-state balance
of power. 49 Yet one of'the most valuable aspects of the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Murrell was that it provided an effective counterpoint to the
concerns raised by the Davis dissent, providing the clear indication that
if other courts apply Davis in the same manner in which it was applied
by the Tenth Circuit, the dissent's concerns are needlessly alarmist and
unfounded.
Each case will have to be measured against the Davis standard
by its own set of facts, because the Court in Davis did not explicitly define the type of conduct that would qualify as sufficiently "severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive." The court merely cited hypothetical
examples of overt, physical deprivation of access to school resources,
while also noting that it would not be necessary to show "physical exclusion to demonstrate that students have been deprived by the actions of
another student or students of an educational opportunity on the basis of
sex. ' " 5 Quite plainly, some cases may present close and difficult questions regarding the specific type of behavior that will demand a response
from school officials to avoid the imposition of liability. And few cases
are likely to involve such heinous conduct as that alleged in Murrell.
Nevertheless, a careful reading of Murrell suggests that the federal courts will have no trouble restraining themselves from imposing
149.
150.

See supra notes 106-19 and accompanying text.
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650-51 (1999).
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unlimited Title IX liability on the public schools. The Murrell opinion
made clear that it was not buying into the Davis dissent's fears about the
potential for unlimited liability due to simple acts of teasing and namecalling among schoolchildren,1 5 1 and that the "deliberate indifference"
'1 2
standard of Davis "provides a high hurdle for plaintiffs." The Murrell
court quickly put to rest one of the main concerns of the Davis dissent:
Davis also recognizes . . . that [d]amages are not available for
simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children..
• even where these comments target differences in gender.
Rather, in the context of student-on-student harassment, damages
are only available where the behavior is so severe, pervasive, and
equal access to
objectively offensive that it denies victims the
53
protect.
to
designed
is
IX
education that Title
Additionally, the Murrell court signaled its understanding that
Title IX liability would accrue only if a school "remains deliberately
' 54
actual knowledge."'
indifferent to acts of harassment of which it has
The court added, "[t]hat standard makes a school district liable only
where it has made a conscious decision to permit sex discrimination in
its programs, and precludes liability where the school district could not
no knowledge thereof or no
have remedied the harassment because it5had
5
harassment.'
the
to
respond
to
authority
As already set forth, the Davis opinion was accompanied by
alarmist predictions of unlimited liability for schools. Whether such
fears have any real basis remains to be seen, but Murrell counters at least
some of those concerns because it reinforces the point that plaintiffs
must clear a high hurdle, by showing "behavior that is so serious, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it denies its victims equal access to
education."'5 6 The type of harassment allegedly suffered by the victim in
Murrell was so egregious that it easily meets this standard. It is difficult
to imagine that Penelope Jones should have no Title IX remedy against
her school if she can prove that school officials knew about the sexual
assaults and not only did nothing to stop them, but also suspended her
from attending classes. Quite plainly, the school's failure to reasonably
respond denied her equal access to educational opportunities. Yet had
151.
152.
153.

Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1246.
Id. at 1252 (Anderson, J., concurring).
Id. at 1246.

154.
155.

Id.

Id.
156. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
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the Davis Court been swayed by the reasoning of the dissent, no Title IX
remedy would have been available to Jones.
The Davis dissent's implication that Davis imposes liability on
schools for the wrongdoing of its students 157 was explicitly rejected
by
the Murrell court. The Murrell court made clear that it understood
the
Davis majority's command that liability would not be imposed on
a
school and its officials for the actions of their students, but for their
own
misconduct, noting that school officials:
[A]llegedly had actual knowledge of Doe's conduct toward Jones
from almost the moment it began to occur, and not only refused
to remedy the harassment but actively participated in concealing
it, including telling Ms. Jones not to inform her mother of Mr.
Doe's actions and refusing to inform her mother themselves
when presented with myriad opportunities to do so.5
Indeed, in contrast to the Davis dissent's characterization of its
opinion, the Davis majority made crystal clear that it was not imposing
liability on a school for the actions of its students,' 59 but that a school
and individual school officials can be liable for their own misconduct
that involves failing to take appropriate action when they have knowledge of student wrongdoing and the authority to deal with it. A school
receiving federal funds is liable for subjecting its students to discrimination when it is "deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on
student sexual harassment and the harasser is under the school's disciplinary authority." 160 The Davis court took pains to note that Title IX does
not require that funding recipients must "remedy" peer harassment.
"On
the contrary, the recipient must merely respond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not clearly unreasonable. 1 6 ' Murrell was faithful even to this subtle point, when it noted that the principal and teachers
were alleged to have known about "Mr. Doe's harassment of Ms. Jones
and acquiesced in that conduct by refusing to reasonably respond
to
162
it.

The Davis dissent's statements about a school's control of its
students being much more complicated and limited than the Davis
majority acknowledged is likewise put to rest by Murrell. The Murrellcourt
157.

Id. at 662 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).

158.
159.
160.

Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1248.
Davis, 526 U.S. at 641.
Id. at 646-47.

161.
162.

Id. at 648-49.
Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1250.
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scrupulously applied the control element of the Davis standard against
of its case, easily concluding that the school had conthe particular facts
163
Doe.
over
trol
Perhaps the strongest feature of the Murrell decision was its
straightforward presentation of the grossly outrageous circumstances of
a nearly helpless victim who suffered so much at the hands of a fellow
student as well as school officials. The Davis dissent was highly concerned that schools would be subject to suit in federal court for conduct
that is an inescapable part of adolescent life.' 64 Yet the type of brutal
assaults allegedly suffered by the victim in Murrell were anything but an
inescapable part of adolescence.
Murrell did not address the Davis dissent's concerns about erosion of the federal balance and federal intrusion into the operation of the
schools. Yet concerns about abstract notions of federalism seem insignificant beside the immediate issues of surrounding an individual's right
to be free from discrimination in federally funded educational institutions, issues which demanded and received appropriate judicial resolution in Murrell.
Murrell illustrates that the conduct at issue in genuine cases of
student-on-student sexual harassment is far more serious than the routine
irritations of adolescence and that the schools are obligated to respond
appropriately. Responding appropriately, under the standard of Davis v.
that is
Monroe County Board of Education, means responding in a way
6
1
circumstances.
known
the
of
light
in
unreasonable
clearly
not
Despite the content of the dissenting opinion in Davis, public
school officials and the practitioners who advise them need not fear the
prospect of unlimited Title IX liability for the actions of students over
which they have only limited control. While it remains to be seen
whether closer cases, with less egregious circumstances, will result in
the imposition of liability under the Davis standard, both the tone and
content of the Murrell decision suggest that plaintiffs who seek to recover under these theories must at the very least show powerful evidence
of misconduct by schools. As the court observed in Murrell, this is a
high hurdle for plaintiffs.166 Some arguably deserving plaintiffs may be
unable to recover. Yet maintaining this high hurdle may ultimately
strengthen the legal principles involved by ensuring that Davis is less
163.

Id. at 1247.

164.

Davis, 529 U.S. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

165.

Id. at 648-49.

166.

Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1252 (Anderson, J., concurring).
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vulnerable to attack in future decisions that may seek to erode its central
holding.
Rather than providing a fertile breeding ground for federal complaints about playground teasing, or that henceforth "Johnny will find

that the routine problems of adolescence are to be resolved by invoking a

federal right to demand assignment to a desk two rows away,' 67 Davis
recognized simply that deliberate indifference to "severe, pervasive, and

objectively offensive" sexual harassment by students can deprive other
students of their right to equal education opportunities, and that no
longer may school districts and school officials avoid liability under the

theory that students are not agents of the school. 68
CONCLUSION

As applied in Murrell, Davis requires that prospective plaintiffs
who bring student-on-student sexual harassment claims against schools

under Title IX and § 1983 must continue to meet a very high standard.
Only when school officials have actual knowledge of and were deliberately indifferent to harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprives a victim of access to the educational
benefits of the school will liability be imposed.' 69
Courts would do well to use the Murrell decision as a model for
the correct application of the Davis standards in future cases of studenton-student sexual harassment under Title IX. If they do, they will have
little difficulty weeding out non-meritorious claims while protecting the
educational access rights of students.
SCOTT D. HAGEL

167.
168.

169.

Davis, 529 U.S. at 686 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 645-46.
Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1246.
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